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Abstract. We present an attack detection scheme for a water treat-
ment system. We leverage the connectivity of two stages of the process
to detect attacks downstream from the point of attack. Based on a math-
ematical model of the process, carefully crafted and executed attacks, are
detected by deploying CUSUM and Bad-Data detectors. Extensive ex-
periments are carried out and the results show the performance of the
proposed scheme.
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1 Introduction
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) are the integration of computing elements with
the physical world [8]. The incorporation of communication networking technolo-
gies with legacy industrial control systems have exposed these to outside world.
The secure operation of such systems requires novel security solutions as the
threat models are different from cyber only systems [16]. Developing new theory
to detect these and other attacks has been the focus of research in computer
science, systems and control engineering, and other fields [2–5,7, 9–11,13,14].
In this manuscript, we look into security threats in a water treatment testbed.
These plants are spread over vast geographical areas, where the physical process
is controlled based on remote sensor readings received over the communication
networks. However, an attacker might change those sensor measurements which
could lead to an undesired control. Several attacks have been reported on water
systems in ICS-CERT report [6]. Most of the control theoretic approaches on
secure CPS are based on the dynamic system model of the physical process.
A residual signal is obtained by subtracting the sensor measurements from the
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sensor estimates (obtained using the system model). An anomaly is detected
based on the statistical properties of this residual signal. A large proportion of
the literature considers attacks that are executed and attempted to be detected
on the same portion of the system, however, many CPS systems are large-scale
multistage processes in which the whole process is subdivided into several inter-
connected stages. Typically each stage is dependent on the previous stage of the
plant, thus it is interesting to model systems at the multistage level [1, 7, 9, 13].
For this case study, we work on a 6 stage water treatment testbed as explained
in section 4. In the work presented here, we show the ability to detect attacks
that occur in previous stages of the plant, thereby exploiting the coupling be-
tween the stages through the physical process. By extensive experimentation on
a real testbed, we have shown that due to multistage combined estimation, the
detectors on either stage would detect the executed attacks on another different
stage. Two major contribution of our work are, (a): Proposed a multistage attack
detection scheme, (b): Implementation of the proposed scheme on a real world
testbed.
2 Background and System Model
We consider a Linear Time Invariant (LTI) stochastic process of the form:{
x(tk+1) = Fx(tk) +Gu(tk) + v(tk),
y(tk) = Cx(tk) + η(tk),
(1)
with sampling time-instants tk, k ∈ IN, state x ∈ IRn, measured output y ∈ IRm,
control input u ∈ IRl, matrices F , G, and C of appropriate dimensions, and i.i.d.
multivariate zero-mean Gaussian noises v ∈ IRn and η ∈ IRm with covariance
matrices R1 ∈ IRn×n, R1 ≥ 0 and R2 ∈ IRm×m, R2 ≥ 0, respectively. The
initial state x(t1) is assumed to be a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with
covariance matrix R0 ∈ IRn×n, R0 ≥ 0. The processes v(tk), k ∈ N and η(tk),
k ∈ N and the initial condition x(t1) are mutually independent. At the time-
instants tk, k ∈ N , the output of the process y(tk) is sampled and transmitted
over a communication channel. In this paper, we focus on attacks on sensor
measurements by spoofing the signals coming from the sensors to the controller.
After each transmission and reception, the attacked output y¯ takes the form:
y¯(tk) := y(tk) + δ(tk) = Cx(tk) + η(tk) + δ(tk), (2)
where δ(tk) ∈ IRm denotes additive sensor attacks. Define xk := x(tk), uk :=
u(tk), vk := v(tk), yk := y(tk), ηk := η(tk), and δk := δ(tk).
Residual-based detection mechanisms require an estimator of the system
state; here we use the steady state Kalman Filter:
xˆk+1 = Fxˆk +Guk + L(y¯k − Cxˆk), (3)
with estimated state xˆk ∈ IRn, xˆ1 = E[x(t1)], where E[·] denotes expectation,
and gain matrix L ∈ IRn×m. The estimation error, ek := xk − xˆk, is governed by
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the following difference equation
ek+1 =
(
F − LC)ek + vk − Lηk − Lδk. (4)
If pair (F,C) is detectable, the observer gain L can be selected such that (F−LC)
is Schur. Moreover, under detectability of (F,C), the covariance matrix Pk :=
E[eke
T
k ] converges to steady state (in the absence of attacks) in the sense that
limk→∞ Pk = P exists. For δk = 0 and given L (such that (F −LC) is Schur), it
can be verified that the asymptotic covariance matrix P = limk→∞ Pk is given
by the solution P of the following Lyapunov equation: (F −LC)P (F −LC)T −
P+R1+LR2L
T = 0 where 0 denotes the zero matrix of appropriate dimensions.
It is assumed that the system has reached steady state before an attack occurs.
The estimator predictions are compared with sensor measurements y¯k which
potentially include attacks. If the difference between what is measured and the
estimation is larger than expected, there may be a fault in or attack on the
system. Define the residual random sequence rk, k ∈ IN as
rk := yˆk − Cxˆk = Cek + ηk + δk, (5)
For this residual, we formulate a one-sided hypothesis where we either accept or
reject the null hypothesis that there are no attacks, in which case, the distribution
of the residual is zero mean with the attack-free variance.
2.1 Detection Methods
We consider a dedicated detector on each sensor. Throughout the rest of this
paper we will reserve the index i to denote the sensor/detector, i ∈ I :=
{1, 2, . . . ,m}. With Ci being the i-th row of C and ηk,i and δk,i denoting the i-th
entries of ηk and δk, respectively. We propose the absolute value of the entries
of the residual sequence as distance measures:
zk,i := |rk,i| = |yk,i − Cixk,i + δk,i| = |Ciek + ηk,i + δk,i|. (6)
Note that, if there are no attacks, |rk,i| follows a half-normal distribution [15].
CUSUM Detector: Sk,i = 0, i ∈ l := {1, 2, ...,m},{
Sk,i = max(0, Sk−1,i + |rk,i| − bi), if Sk−1,i ≤ τi,
Sk,i = 0 and k¯i = k − 1, if Sk−1,i > τi,
(7)
with bias bi ∈ IR>0, detection threshold τi ∈ IR>0, and alarm time(s) k¯i. The
idea is that the test sequence Sk,i accumulates |rk,i| and alarms are triggered
when Sk,i exceeds the threshold τi. Once the the bias is chosen, the threshold τi
must be selected to fulfill a desired false alarm rate A∗i [12].
Bad-Data Detector:
If |rk,i| > αi, k¯i = k, i ∈ I. (8)
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where αi ∈ IR>0 is the detection threshold and k¯i are the alarms time(s). In
this case, the idea is that alarms are triggered if |rk,i| exceeds the threshold
αi. Similar to the CUSUM procedure, the parameter αi is selected to satisfy a
required false alarm rate A∗i .
3 Attacker Model
In this section, we introduce the attacks launched on the system. A usual at-
tacker model for CPSs encompasses the intentions and goals of the attacker [16].
Attacker’s intentions may vary from damaging components to changing a sys-
tem property or performance degradation. It is assumed that the attacker has
access to real-time sensor measurements. It also has perfect knowledge of the sys-
tem dynamics, the control inputs, and the implemented detection procedures.
We launch attacks on the two tanks (Tank-A, Tank-B) subsystem of the SWaT
as shown in Figure 1. We consider a man-in-the-middle (MitM ) attacker pro-
file [17]. This attacker is able to get access to level sensor readings from Tank-A
and Tank-B in real-time and inject signals. Three attacks (corresponding to three
different injected signals) are considered and implemented on Tank-A of the real
water treatment facility:
Constant Bias Injection Attack: In such an attack, the attacker adds constant
offsets to true sensor measurements, i.e., δk,i = δ¯i ∈ R. Thus, the controller re-
ceives an attacked sensor measurement of the form y¯k,i = yk,i + δ¯i, where δ¯i
denotes the false data injected by the attacker to sensor i. As we will see later
in results section, the constant bias attack is easily detected using the proposed
detection methods.
Zero-Alarm Attack for Bad-Data Detector: This attack is designed to stay
undetected by the Bad-Data detectors. Because the attacker knows the system
dynamics, has access to sensor readings, and knows the detector parameters,
it is able to inject false data into real-time measurements and stay undetected.
Consider the Bad-Data procedure and write (8) in terms of the estimated state
xˆk:
|rk,i| = |yk,i − Cixˆk,i + δk,i| ≤ αi, i ∈ I. (9)
By assumption, the attacker has access to yk,i = Ciyk + ηk,i. Moreover, given
its perfect knowledge of the observer, the opponent can compute the estimated
output Cixˆk and then construct yk,i − Cixˆk,i. It follows that
δk,i = Cixˆk,i − yk,i + αi − i, (αi > i)→ |rk,i| = αi − i, i ∈ I, (10)
is a feasible attack sequence given the capabilities of the attacker. The constant
i > 0 is a small positive constant introduced to account for numerical precision.
These attacks maximize the damage to the CPS by immediately saturating and
maintaining |rk,i| at the constant αi − i. Therefore, for this attack, the sensor
measurements received by the controller take the form:
y¯k,i = Cixˆk,i + αi − i. (11)
VZero-Alarm Attack for CUSUM Detector: This attack is designed to stay
undetected by the CUSUM detectors. Consider the CUSUM procedure and write
(7) in terms of the estimated state xˆk:
Sk,i = max(0, Sk−1,i + |yi − Cixˆk + δk,i| − bi), (12)
if Sk−1,i ≤ τi and Sk,i = 0 if Sk−1,i > τi. As with the Bad-Data procedure,
we look for attack sequences that immediately saturate and then maintain the
CUSUM statistic at Sk,i = τi − i where i (min(τi, bi) > i > 0) is a small
positive constant introduced to account for numerical precision. Assume that
the attack starts at some k = k∗ ≥ 1 and Sk∗−1,i ≤ τi, i.e., the attack does not
start immediately after a false alarm. Consider the attack:
δk,i =
{
τi − i + bi − yi + Cixˆk − Sk−1,i, k = k∗,
bi − yi + Cixˆk, k > k∗.
(13)
This attack accomplishes Sk,i = τi − i for all k ≥ k∗ (thus zero alarms). Note
that the attacker can only induce this sequence by exactly knowing Sk∗−1,i, i.e.,
the value of the CUSUM sequence one step before the attack. This is a strong
assumption since it represents a real-time quantity that is not communicated over
the communication network. Even if the opponent has access to the parameters
of the CUSUM, (bi, τi), given the stochastic nature of the residuals, the attacker
would need to know the complete history of observations (from when the CUSUM
was started) to be able to reconstruct Sk∗−1,i from data. This is an inherent
security advantage in favor of the CUSUM over static detectors like the Bad-
Data or Chi-Squared. Nevertheless, for evaluating the worst case scenario, we
assume that the attacker has access to Sk∗−1,i. Therefore, for this attack, the
sensor measurements received by the controller take the form:
y¯k,i =
{
Cixˆk,i + τi − i + bi − Sk−1,i − i, k = k∗,
Cixˆk,i + bi, k > k
∗.
(14)
4 Experimentation Setup
Majority of work on attack detection has considered a single stage for attack
and detection (e.g., see [18]). Here, we evaluate the situation of using multiple
detectors throughout the process while carrying out a spoofing attack on only
one point. In this case we setup the attack on LIT-101 and then we implement a
detection mechanism on this tank (LIT-101 at Tank-101) and also on the second
tank (LIT-301 of Tank-301). The challenge in using a process-wide detector is
that we require a model that captures not only each stage individually, but also
the physical coupling caused by their interconnection. This experiment considers
possibly the most obvious of this sort of interconnection and dependency between
stages, in the sense that the water out-flow from Tank-101 (Tank-A) should
equal the water in-flow to Tank-301 (Tank-B). We can see an illustration of this
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Parameter Tank-A Tank-B
α 4.61× 10−4 4.59× 10−4
τ 1.60× 10−4 1.48× 10−4
bias b 3.27× 10−4 3.26× 10−4
A∗ 0.025 0.04
Fig. 1. Two-Tank Illustration: Tank-101(A), Tank-301(B). The adjoining table reports
the parameters for both detectors.
scenario in Fig. 1. We model the water level and sensor measurements of the two
tanks using the following difference equations:
{
xk+1,1 = xk,1 + uk,1 − uk,2,
xk+1,2 = xk,2 + uk,2 − uk,3,
{
yk,1 = xk,1 + ηk,1,
yk,2 = xk,2 + ηk,2,
(15)
where xk,j , j = 1, 2 is the water level at tank j, uk,1 and uk,2 denote water
flowing in and out of tank one, respectively, uk,3 is the water flowing out of tank
two, and ηk,j denotes sensor noise. Then, the model of the coupled tanks is of
the form (1) with matrices:{
F = R2 = C =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, G =
(
1 −1 0
0 −1 1
)
, R1 = R0 = 0. (16)
Having the system model, we can construct a Luenberger observer of the form
(3) to estimate the state of the system. The observer matrix L is selected such
that the matrix F − LC (with F and C as in (16)) is Schur and its eigenvalues
are at 0.5:
L =
(
0.35 0.15
−0.15 0.65
)
.
For both detectors, the thresholds (and biases for the CUSUM) have to be
selected to satisfy desired false alarm rates A∗j . These parameters are selected
according to the results in [12] to satisfy a false alarm rate of approximately
A∗1 = A∗2 = 0.025 for both detectors. For our combined detector, we test the
obtained detector parameters (shown in Table 1) for both the Bad-Data and the
CUSUM procedures. We verify by experimenting that for the given parameters,
the alarms raised by the detectors converge to A∗ = 0.04 (approximately) in the
absence of attacks.
5 Performance of Proposed Detectors
We executed the three types of attacks introduced in Section 3 with a combined
detection procedure running on Tank-A and Tank-B simultaneously.
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Fig. 2. Constant bias attack detection by combined Bad-Data detector
Constant Bias Attack Detection Figure 2 shows the water level at the tanks
when the system is under a constant bias attack of δ¯1 = 0.01m. The PLC re-
ceived this attacked measurement value with Bad-Data detectors running on
both tanks. The true value (plotted in gray) of the level at Tank-A is about
0.5m. This true level remains constant throughout the attack and the inlet pump
and valve are switched OFF. The attack is launched at k = 11s (time instant
in plot) and the Bad-Data detector monitoring Tank-A detects it immediately.
The Bad-Data detector monitoring Tank-B detects the attack at k = 28s. This
proves that the combined detection procedure for Bad-Data detector works well.
Furthermore this attack was also detected by the CUSUM detectors running at
Tank-A and Tank-B.
Zero-Alarm Attack for Bad-Data Detector We now test a zero-alarm Bad-
Data attack on Tank-A. Both the detector types (i.e., Bad-Data detector and
CUSUM detector) monitor Tank-A and Tank-B. In our proposed scheme, when
an attack is launched at a single stage, it can be detected by a detector running
on another stage. Here we launch a zero-alarm attack against the Bad-Data
detector at Tank-A, and found that it can be detected only by CUSUM detector
at Tank-A and by both detectors (CUSUM and Bad-Data) running at Tank-B.
For The attacker to remain undetected at Tank-A he have to spoof the sensor
value according to section 3.
Zero-Alarm Attack for Bad-Data and CUSUM Detector The last attack
type which we executed is the zero-alarm attack for Bad-Data and CUSUM
detector. Since this attack is designed to raise no alarms for the Bad-Data or the
CUSUM detectors, neither detector on Tank-A detects the attack. The attacker
has the complete knowledge of the detectors running on Tank-A, so he can
deviate the level of the tank in such a way that Bad-Data detector and CUSUM
detector at Tank-A would not be able to detect it, but the combined estimate
and detection of the two-tank multistage process makes it possible to detect this
attack by the detectors at Tank-B. The result is shown in Fig. 3.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a real-life experimental case-study about how a
multistage detection procedure could be very useful. We showed that proper
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Fig. 3. Zero-alarm Bad-Data/CUSUM detection by combined detectors at Tank-B.
modeling of the system and the selection of right parameters for detection
threshold are very important. Our study points out the limitations of statistical
anomaly detectors towards stealthy attacks which are intelligently designed to
raise no alarms (zero-alarm attacks). However, we can still use these detection
methods if physics of the system is properly integrated in the model for system
dynamics. Due to state inter-dependencies, an attacker can hide itself in one
stage but it’s effects can be seen in the following stages. Our results show that
it is possible to detect zero-alarm attacks using the proposed scheme.
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